Manna From Heaven

“Leveraged risk is a cancer in the market”

So reported the online edition of the British newspaper Telegraph on 7 March 2008, apparently quoting UBS (and they should know, right?)

SAW decided to keep that quote, figuring that something would pan out in the coming days – and it did. First, the default and collapse of Carlyle Capital and then………. Bear Stearns, Wall Street’s fifth largest investment bank, nearly panned out, following a loss of confidence by hedge fund clients who withdrew their cash. All this against an accelerating backdrop of rumour and innuendo from 6 March 2008 that European banks, fixed income and stock traders had stopped trading with Bear because it was having trouble with daily liquidity and that it was not receiving short term financing from banks. You just knew something was very wrong.

By 15 March 2008, despite repeated statements from Bear executives that solvency was not an issue (the real clue that it really was), the US Federal Reserve and J. P Morgan Chase stepped in with an emergency cash lifeline for 28 days. The Wall Street Journal’s online report for 15 March 2008 spells out the sequence of events.

Since Bear is technically an investment bank and not a commercial bank, it could not receive the money directly from the Fed. Instead, the Fed lent the money to J.P.Morgan, a commercial bank, who then re-lent it to Bear. The Fed assumes the risk of default.

So what are the lessons in all this for SMEs?

• You don’t have, or at least you shouldn’t be having, the apparent luxury of massive debt to equity ratios. One of the more astounding facts to come out of Wall Street last week was the revelation that companies like Bear were leveraged in mortgage-related derivatives at 32 times equity. That’s a fancy way of saying that you have one dollar in your left pocket, but you owe 32 bucks from your right pocket – and you don’t have any cash flow. How long do you think you could survive?

• The more complex the derivatives, the deeper and more pervasive the risk of default. Let’s make one thing very clear. There is a difference between the sub-prime residential and other “asset” backed (read plasma screen TVs) mortgages – which are theoretically quantifiable, and the mountain of structured finance (read paper transactions) which sliced, diced, chopped and pureed these mortgages into ever more sophisticated and ultimately toxic cocktails whose value is unknown – except for the blatant fact that whatever it was, it ain’t now.

• By way of contrast to (1) and (2) above, the sale of Invoices through Factoring does not result in debt. First, it improves your debt to equity ratio. Second, it improves your Balance Sheet (because the Invoices, which are listed as Current Assets, are converted into cash). Third, it improves your cash flow. Funny how Wall Street titans forgot that the more dodgy the security, the worse your cash flow, the Balance Sheet and debt to equity ratio. Pretty basic stuff.

• For an SME, the unpaid commercial invoice is a quantifiable asset. The due diligence that the funding source does on the client and the ultimate payor ,is the assessment of risk to determine manageability. It's a tried and tested recipe without dubious notions of "mark to model" valuations.

• And the rumour and the innuendo? SMEs are sometimes concerned that Factoring will damage their reputation or give the impression that they are financially unstable. It’s well known that Fortune 500 companies factor to improve their cash flow. An SME that is cognizant enough to guarantee its cash flow through factoring, capitalize on the time value of money and ensure that Receivables outperform Payables, will be the subject of one kind of rumour. Smart.

© 2008 Sanjeev Aaron Williams